The use of active interrogation (AI) to induce delayed neutron emission is a well-established technique for the characterization of special nuclear materials (SNM). Delayed neutrons have isotopecharacteristic spectral and temporal signatures, which provide the basis for isotope identification. However, in bulk materials that contain an appreciable fissile (e.g., 235 U or 233 U) fraction, such as highly-enriched uranium (HEU), delayed neutrons have a high probability of inducing additional fissions. As a result, the overall delayed neutron signature consists of two distinct components: the "primary" delayed neutrons (emitted directly by fission fragments), and the "secondary prompt" fission neutrons produced in fission induced by primary delayed neutrons. These prompt products differ from "primary" delayed neutrons both in their energy spectra and in the presence of coincident radiation released by the parent fission event. The presence and relative quantity of prompt products from delayed fission depend on the cross-section of the material in the energy range of delayed neutrons, which may differ significantly between isotopes, thus providing an exploitable means for isotope differentiation. In this work, we demonstrate two experimental approaches for discriminating between 235 U and 238 U isotopes based on the measurement of delayed neutron-induced fission products. First, HEU and depleted uranium objects are differentiated through the detection of highenergy prompt neutrons from delayed fission using both recoil-based organic liquid scintillators and thermalization spectra from a custom-built capture-gated composite detector. Secondly, coincident radiation measurements are used as the basis for discrimination by comparing the overall rates and time evolution of fission events when delayed neutrons are present.
I. INTRODUCTION
Measurement methods that can provide detailed information on the composition of special nuclear materials (SNM) are integral to many nuclear security and nonproliferation applications. In particular, determination of the relative isotopic abundance of 235 U and 238 U plays a central role in international safeguards inspections, the production and accounting of nuclear fuel, and verification of proper storage and dismantlement of weapons components under disarmament treaties [1] [2] [3] . Active interrogation (AI) sources use external radiation to induce nuclear reactions in a target material, and are commonly employed to characterize the content of SNM by inducing fission to augment both the prompt and delayed neutron and gamma-ray signatures emitted by the material [4] .
When SNM is interrogated using a pulsed neutron source, the induced fission signature persists even after the source is turned off. Source neutrons become thermalized in the surrounding material, and their population decays with a characteristic time on the order of a few microseconds [5] . When SNM is present, these thermalized neutrons can induce additional fission events, providing a secondary source of neutrons, which causes the overall population of thermalized neutrons to decay * kogren@umich.edu † Currently at Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, TN 37831 USA ‡ ijov@umich.edu more slowly. Measurements of the neutron dieaway can thus provide an indication of the presence of fissile material, and are a well-established means for detecting and characterizing SNM [6, 7] . Unlike the common dieaway technique, this work focuses on another persistent signal: the emission and subsequent interaction of delayed neutrons in the interrogated material. By recording the sample response over a much longer timescale (tens of seconds), we show that it is also possible to deduce additional signatures from 235 U and 238 U and gain insight into the isotopic content of the sample.
The emission of delayed neutrons by fission fragments is a well-known phenomenon [8] [9] [10] , and the measurement of delayed neutron signatures has long been established as an effective method for detecting fissionable materials [11] . Fission reactions generate a variety of unstable nuclei, which are typically neutron-rich and undergo β decay. A fraction of the decaying nuclei also release their energy through neutron emission. The delay between the initial fission event and these secondary emitted neutrons depends on the chain decay kinetics, which are characteristic of the fission fragments, and ranges from a few hundreds of nanoseconds to tens of seconds. The β-delayed neutrons are commonly divided into a set of groups based primarily on similarities in their precursor half-lives [12] . The specific parameters for the groups depend on the isotope undergoing fission, as well as the type and energy of the fission-inducing particle. Despite the fact that delayed neutrons account for only a small fraction of the overall fission neutron yield, detection systems that utilize AI to intensify the emitted delayed neutron signal have been successfully used to detect and identify fis-sionable materials [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] .
Because the delayed neutron groups for a particular fissionable isotope have a unique set of individual decay constants, each isotope possesses a characteristic aggregate temporal profile for delayed neutron emission, which can be used as the basis for identification. Previous studies have applied this principle to differentiate SNM samples by measuring the decay of the delayed neutron rate for short-lived [19] and long-lived groups [20] [21] [22] . In our own prior work, we have utilized both the buildup and decay time profiles of long-lived delayed neutron groups to perform isotopic discrimination and infer the enrichment level of uranium [23] . While the energy and timing characteristics of delayed neutrons have been determined by dedicated precision measurements, the observed delayed neutron signature for bulk materials can be complicated by additional interactions before the delayed neutrons escape the object. In the case of fissile materials such as 235 U and 239 Pu, delayed neutrons with an average energy of 250-450 keV can readily induce numerous additional fission events. This delayed neutron-induced fission is a basic concept in nuclear reactor kinetics, where it represents an important consideration in maintaining the desired state of criticality in a reactor. In the context of neutron energy spectrum, however, it leads to an overall delayed signal that is a superposition of two components: "primary" delayed neutrons, which are emitted directly from the decay of fission fragments, and the prompt fission neutrons, where the fission is induced by delayed neutrons. In fact, in order to measure the delayed neutron energy spectra with a high degree of accuracy, sample sizes have been restricted to small amounts (<10 g) of material with the express purpose of limiting distortions caused by fission multiplication [12, 24, 25] .
Because the prompt fission products of the delayed neutron-induced fission events are emitted nearly instantaneously, they mimic the time distribution of the delayed neutrons, and do not significantly alter the measured neutron temporal profile (notwithstanding the potential differences in detector efficiency when measuring the time-evolving neutron spectrum). In contrast, the overall delayed energy spectrum is significantly changed by the introduction of prompt fission neutrons, which typically have much higher energies than delayed neutrons. Furthermore, the prompt neutrons from delayed fission are accompanied by additional coincident neutrons and γ rays. The determining factor in the relative abundance of prompt fission products in the delayed signal is the average fission cross-section of a particular material in the delayed neutron energy range. Because this cross-section may differ significantly between isotopes, as is the case for 235 U and 238 U, the detection of high-energy prompt neutrons and coincident radiation from fission in the delayed signature of SNM may provide the basis for isotopic identification.
Here, we present two experimental methods for disambiguating the genesis of delayed neutrons as a means for discriminating 235 U and 238 U. In the first approach, recoil-based organic liquid scintillators and a custombuilt capture-gated composite detector are used to perform spectroscopic measurements of delayed neutrons, and highly-enriched uranium (HEU) is successfully differentiated from depleted uranium (DU) based on the presence of high-energy prompt neutrons in its delayed signature. While the measurement of high-energy prompt neutrons from delayed neutron-induced fission has previously been proposed as a method for discriminating uranium isotopes [26] , to the best of our knowledge, this work represents the first time that such energy information has been specifically targeted and extracted from the overall delayed signature as a means for isotopic identification. In the second approach, we demonstrate the first use of coincidence counting to observe the contribution of delayed neutron-induced fission to the overall fission rate and successfully differentiate HEU from DU on this basis.
II. MATERIALS & METHODS
Experimental measurements were performed at the Device Assembly Facility (DAF), Nevada National Security Site, using highly-enriched uranium (HEU) and depleted uranium (DU) test objects of similar mass. A set of concentric HEU hemispheres known as the Rocky Flats shells was used as the HEU object. The Rocky Flats shells have a bulk density of 18.664 g/cm 3 and an isotopic content of 93.16% 235 U, 5.35% 238 U, and less than 2% of other isotopes of uranium [27] . Shells 01-24 were assembled into a spherical object with an approximate mass of 13.8 kg. Detailed information on the masses and dimensions of the individual shells can be found in Ref. [27] . The depleted uranium object also consisted of a set of hemispherical shells arranged to form a sphere. The mass of the DU object was 12.8 kg, which was the closest approximation to the HEU object mass that could be achieved with the available shell configurations.
Each uranium object was interrogated with 14.1-MeV neutrons produced by a Thermo Scientific P211 DT neutron generator, with an approximate isotropic yield of 10 8 n/s. The objects were placed at a distance of 13 cm from the generator, as measured from the center of the object to the center of the target plane in the generator tube. The DT generator was operated at a pulse rate of 100 Hz with a pulse width of approximately 10 μs, which was consistent across all measurements.
In each measurement, the uranium object was surrounded by an array of detectors, which included one two-inch NaI(Tl) detector, two three-inch Eljen EJ309 organic liquid scintillators [28] , and one custom-built heterogeneous composite scintillator. The composite detector is a larger version of the prototype described in Ref. [29] , and consists of an array of 1×1×76 mm 3 GS20 lithium glass square rods embedded in a cylindrical matrix of scintillating polyvinyl toluene (PVT) with a height and diameter of 12.7 cm. The GS20 glass is 6.6% lithium by weight, and is enriched to approximately 95% 6 Li. A diagram of the composite detector design is shown in Fig. 1 . The principal detection mechanism for the composite detector is neutron capture by 6 Li, which has a reaction Q-value of 4.8 MeV and releases a triton and an alpha particle. The short range of the heavy charged particle products means that they generally deposit most of their energy in the lithium-doped glass, which possesses very different scintillation properties from the PVT plastic. As a result, neutron capture events are easily distinguishable by both a characteristic pulse shape and the characteristic Q-value of the reaction. The PVT matrix surrounding the lithium glass rods serves a dual purpose. Not only does it increase the capture efficiency of the detector by moderating the incident neutrons, but the scintillation response of the PVT to proton recoils in the neutron thermalization process provides a signal whose magnitude is correlated to the incident neutron energy [30] . By exploiting the time coincidence between a capture pulse and the preceding thermalization pulse, spectroscopic neutron energy analysis can be performed [31] .
For each measurement, the composite detector was placed vertically at a distance of 21 cm from the central axis of the PVT cylinder to the center of the uranium object. The NaI(Tl) and EJ309 scintillators were placed at different locations around the object, each at a distance of 11 cm from the center of the object to the front face of the detector. Fig. 2 shows the experimental setup used for measurement of both uranium objects.
Each detector was powered using a CAEN DT5533 high-voltage power supply, and the output was digitized using a CAEN DT5730 14-bit, 500-MHz desktop waveform digitizer with digital pulse processing-pulse shape discrimination (DPP-PSD) firmware. Data acquisition and storage was performed using CAEN Multi-Parameter Spectroscopy Software (CoMPASS) [32] . For each waveform, short-gate (Q short ) and long-gate (Q long ) charge integrals were recorded to provide the basis for pulse shape discrimination. The integration boundary parameters were defined relative to t start , the start of the waveform determined by the leading edge trigger time in the digitizer. Q short was integrated from t start − t offset to t start + t short , and Q long was integrated from t start − t offset to t start + t long , where t offset is the offset time prior to the start of the waveform, and t short and t long are the endpoints for the short-gate and long-gate integration windows, respectively. The integration parameters were optimized for each detector prior to the experiment, and are presented in Table I . The neutron generator was operated in a series of on/off cycles, during which the induced delayed neutron signatures of the HEU and DU objects were recorded. In each cycle, the generator was turned on for one minute, then off for one minute. Each object was interrogated over a period of about 2.5 hours (∼70 cycles), and the data collected during the off cycles was aggregated to form the overall delayed signal. Passive measurements of the HEU and DU objects were also recorded, for 3 minutes and 10 minutes, respectively. The detectors were calibrated using 137 Cs and AmBe sources.
III. SIMULATION
To estimate the expected contrast in the delayed neutron emission spectra from bulk samples of HEU and DU, Monte Carlo simulations were conducted using the MCNPX-PoliMi particle transport code [33] . Spherical HEU and DU objects of the approximate size and mass of the experimentally measured assemblies were interrogated with 14.1-MeV neutrons, and the time of generation and initial energy of emitted neutrons were recorded upon their arrival in an organic liquid scintillator. The prompt and delayed neutron spectra were separated using a simple time threshold, where neutrons arriving at the detector within 10 microseconds of the generation of the source particle were vetoed. For an average sourcedetector distance of 20 cm, prompt neutrons would have to have energy lower than about 0.5 keV to arrive after the veto time, and portion of the Watt distribution that falls within this range is less than 0.1%. Within the delayed neutron data, primary delayed neutrons and prompt neutrons from delayed fission were differentiated by tracking their individual histories in the MCNPX-PoliMi collision file output. Based on the particle and generation numbers of each delayed neutron, the corresponding parent fission event was located within the fission chain in the uranium object. If the time delay between the parent fission and detection of the delayed neutron was greater than 10 μs, the event was categorized as a primary delayed neutron. Otherwise, it was considered to be a prompt neutron from delayed fission. This analysis method allowed for estimation of the relative contribution of each type of delayed neutron to the overall delayed spectrum emitted by each object. For HEU, prompt neutrons from delayed fission account for about 65% of the delayed neutron signature, with the remaining 35% contributed by primary delayed neutrons. In contrast, primary delayed neutrons made up over 98% of the emitted signal for DU.
In addition to the experimental object materials, simulations of the expected relative proportion of primary delayed neutrons and prompt neutrons from delayed fission were performed for low-enriched uranium (LEU) to explore the potential for finer determination of the enrichment level based on the induced neutron spectrum. Enrichment levels of 5% and 20% were chosen for simulation, as they represent common benchmarks on the uranium enrichment scale (reactor fuel and the LEU enrichment limit, respectively). Table II shows a summary of the simulated neutron spectrum breakdown for each material. While higher-energy prompt neutrons make up only a small fraction of the delayed neutron spectrum for DU, they form a significant part of the delayed signal for 5%enriched LEU. As a result, it may be possible to distinguish LEU from unenriched uranium based on the presence of higher-energy neutrons in the delayed neutron signature. Furthermore, the relative contribution from prompt neutrons doubles as enrichment increases from 5% to 20%, and more than doubles again for weaponsgrade enrichment levels (>90%). Such separation suggests that the proportion of higher-energy delayed neutrons may serve as an observable for estimating the enrichment level of uranium-containing materials.
For each material, the fractional contributions of primary delayed neutrons and prompt neutrons from delayed fission were used to approximate the delayed neutron energy spectra, which were then used to simulate the expected response in the composite detector using the Geant4 framework [34] . While MCNPX is better suited for simulating the production of delayed neutrons, Geant4 does not have the same geometrical limitations, making it the more convenient choice for modeling the complex structure of the composite detector. To simulate the light output response to thermalization recoils in the PVT, the detector was bombarded with neutrons with energies sampled from the delayed [12] and prompt [35] energy spectra in accordance with their relative proportion for each isotope. The light output produced by neutron elastic scatters on protons in the detector was modeled using a similar method to the one described in Ref. [36] , with a polynomial function of the form
where L is the light output, E is the energy deposited on the proton, and a, b, and c are fitting parameters. The light output contribution from scatters on carbon nuclei was assumed to be approximately 2% of the energy deposited. A Gaussian broadening function was parameterized and applied to the calculated light output according to the method outlined in Ref. [37] . Fig. 3 shows the simulated delayed neutron energy spectra for bulk HEU and DU, as well as the expected light output response of the composite detector. The simulated delayed energy spectra and corresponding detector response show very significant differences for each material based on the presence of delayed fission events, especially at higher energies. This suggests that 235 U and 238 U should be readily distinguishable based on the presence of high-energy neutrons in the measured delayed signal.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS & DISCUSSION
A significant advantage of the composite detector is that it provides strong discrimination of neutron-capture events on 6 Li, which can then be used to identify potential preceding thermalization pulses in the detector and extract spectroscopic energy information from the incident neutrons. Fig. 4 shows the pulse-shape parameter (P SP ) and light output distribution for the AmBe calibration measurement in the composite detector, where the P SP is defined as
(2) The parameter space located around P SP = 0.55 and light output of about 0.32 MeVee corresponds to neutron capture events. A 3-σ cut was established in two dimensions around this region, and any events falling within the cut were classified as neutron captures in the subsequent measurements.
The delayed neutron energy spectra for HEU and DU were compared by analyzing the capture-gated thermalization light output response in the composite detector. For each neutron capture event, the previously recorded pulse was examined to determine if it could have been caused by thermalization of the fast neutron in the PVT prior to capture. Because the type of PVT used in the composite detector is not PSD-capable, there is only one recoil region corresponding to both neutron and gammaray interactions. A Gaussian fit to this region established a mean P SP value of 0.0865, and pulses exhibiting deviation from the mean greater than 3-σ were rejected. Geant4 simulations were also used to determine the time scale of neutron thermalization in the composite detector. Both prompt and delayed incident neutron energy spectra were modeled; the results indicate that 99% of captures occur within 76 μs of the initial scattering interaction in the detector, and that incident neutron energy has little effect on the shape of the time distribution of thermalization pulses. As such, candidate thermalization pulses that occur more than 76 μs before the subsequent capture event were also rejected from the thermalization light output distribution. Fig. 5 shows the resulting capture-gated thermalization light output distributions for HEU and DU.
FIG. 5:
Comparison of thermalization light output distributions for HEU and DU. The count rate for DU above 400 keVee is consistent with the measured rate of gamma-ray accidentals within the thermalization time window.
While some increase in the delayed neutron counting rate is expected for HEU relative to DU due to the greater mass of the HEU object and increased fission cross section for 14.1-MeV neutrons, the higher overall rate is also consistent with increased multiplication caused by delayed neutrons. However, the marked increase in highlight-output events for HEU indicates a significant difference in the overall energy spectrum, which can be explained by the presence of higher-energy prompt neutrons from delayed fission.
Examination of the time distribution of thermalization pulses can provide additional insight into the observed light output spectra. While the simulated light output response for delayed neutrons from 238 U is largely restricted to below 400 keVee, the experimentally measured distribution extends to higher light outputs. Since the delayed neutrons do not have enough energy to produce higher light output pulses in the detector (and a large fraction cannot even produce a pulse above a 100 keVee detection threshold), this suggests either that there is a higher rate of delayed fission than predicted by tabulated nuclear data, or that the thermalization light output distribution is dominated by gamma-ray accidentals from background or passive emission by the DU object. If accidentals dominate, then the distribution I(t) of time differences between two adjacent pulses is governed by the general expression
where t is the time between two pulses, and r is the rate of accidentals. In the scenario where there are very few true thermalization events, Eq. (3) predicts that the time distribution should exhibit a simple exponential decay shape. Fig. 6 shows the experimental thermalization time distributions for HEU and DU, which have been fitted with an exponential function representing the expected contribution of background accidentals. In both cases, the exponential function was fitted to the time window beyond 90 ns, where the contribution of true neutron thermalization events is negligible (less than 1% of the total distribution). The model is then extended back over the range of possible neutron thermalization times. In the case of DU, the exponential function is consistent with the entire distribution, suggesting that few, if any, of the pulses preceding neutron capture events are caused by thermalization of delayed neutrons. In contrast, the time distribution for HEU departs significantly from a simple exponential shape in the neutron thermalization window, and the point where this deviation becomes noticeable is near the maximum thermalization time of 76 μs predicted by simulation. After subtracting the background exponential fit, 98.5% of thermalization pulses occur within the 76 μs time window, in close agreement with the simulated result of 99%. Furthermore, the slope of the exponential fit (−0.02358) is the same for each data set, which suggests a common cause of accidentals, such as gamma-ray background.
Additionally, the overall rate of recoil pulses recorded by the composite detector between generator runs for DU is consistent with the assertion that the events in the DU thermalization spectrum above 400 keVee are caused by gamma-ray accidentals in the thermalization window. When the generator is turned off following interrogation, the observed rate of recoil pulses is ∼2.1×10 4 s −1 . At this rate, the average time between events is 48 μs, and the probability of observing a random recoil pulse within the 76 μs time window preceding a capture pulse is 79.5%. In the experimental results, 74.0% of recorded capture events are accompanied by a preceding pulse within 76 μs.
The observed rate of events within the thermalization window is close to the prediction if all thermalization candidate pulses were truly from gamma-ray accidentals, but it is still somewhat too low. This may be explained by the effects of delayed neutron contributions to the recoil P SP region and pileup pulses in the neutron capture region. Specifically, if the recoil rate contains significant contributions from delayed neutrons, the rate of events in the thermalization window will be higher than expected for random gamma-ray accidentals because neutron re-coils are much more likely to be followed by a subsequent capture event. Furthermore, misclassified pileup pulses in the capture P SP region are less likely to be preceded by a neutron recoil event. This results in a situation where the random gamma-ray rate, and thus the probability of an event within the thermalization time window, is slightly overestimated.
To correct for the effects of delayed neutron recoils on the estimation of the gamma-ray accidental rate, a 400 keVee light output threshold was applied, effectively removing neutron contributions from the spectrum. The threshold was determined based on the simulated light output response of the composite detector to delayed neutrons, as shown in Fig. 3 . The overall rate of recoil events above the threshold was 5.6×10 3 s −1 , resulting in an average time between events of 177 μs and a 34.9% probability of observing a random event within the 76 μs thermalization window. In the experimental data, 33.9% of capture events were accompanied by a preceding recoil event within 76 μs, which strongly suggests that the rate of thermalization events in the DU light output spectrum ( Fig. 5 ) above 400 keVee is fully accounted for by gamma-ray accidentals. Table III provides a summary of the recoil rates, probability of gamma-ray accidentals in the thermalization window, and comparison to experimental data, both with and without application of the 400 keVee light output threshold. Recoil-based organic liquid scintillators are poorly suited to detecting lower-energy primary delayed neutrons because those neutrons are unlikely to produce a response above a detection threshold of ∼100 keVee. However, higher-energy prompt neutrons from delayed fission can be easily detected, as they are far more likely to produce a pulse above the threshold. Fig. 7 shows the P SP and light output distributions measured by the EJ309 detector for HEU and DU, respectively. In the HEU data, a fast neutron recoil region around P SP =0.28 is readily apparent. However, this feature is entirely absent from the DU distribution. This stark contrast provides convincing evidence that the presence or absence of highenergy fission neutrons in the delayed neutrons spectrum can be used to perform isotopic discrimination. Coincidence measurements were also used to detect the presence of delayed neutron-induced fission events. Coincidence time distributions were recorded for HEU and DU using two different detector pairings: composite-EJ309 and composite-NaI(Tl). In each case, the coincidence event rate recorded during the neutron generator off cycles was compared with the rate observed during passive measurement for each uranium object. Example coincidence time distributions measured during the delayed neutron window are shown in Fig. 8 for the composite-EJ309 and composite-NaI(Tl) detector pairings, respectively.
A summary of the measured coincidence rates for each detector pairing and scenario is presented in Table IV . Because both samples contain 238 U, which undergoes spontaneous fission, the comparison between HEU and DU is not as simple as noting the presence or absence of coincident radiation from fission. While the relative change in the total coincidence rate after interrogation (when delayed neutrons are present) is much greater for HEU, suggesting that much of the change is due to delayed neutron-induced fission events, this interpretation must be weighted against a number of complicating fac- 
tors.
First, the measured passive coincidence rate for each material is much too high to attribute to spontaneous fission alone. Based on the material compositions, a specific activity of 12.44 MBq/kg, and a spontaneous fission probability of 5.4 × 10 −7 per decay, the expected spontaneous fission rate for the DU and HEU objects would be 87 fission/s and 5 fissions/s, respectively. MCNPX simulations of the experimental configuration showed that the probability of a fission event producing observable coincident pulses in the composite and EJ309 detectors was 0.3% for HEU and 0.053% for DU. For coincidence pulses in the composite and NaI(Tl) detectors, the probabilities were 0.08% and 0.0006% for HEU and DU, respectively. Table V shows the expected spontaneous fission (SF) tagging rates for each object based on the calculated spontaneous fission rates and simulated tagging probabilities. In both cases, the expected tagging rates are several orders of magnitude lower than the experimentally observed coincidence rates. Further investigation of the coincidence pulses showed that they were consistent with true recoil events and not caused by spurious sources such as electronic noise. The measurement environment at DAF is complex, with many other objects near the experimental setup being subjected to bombardment by 14.1-MeV neutrons, so the high coincidence rates may be partially explained by gamma-ray radiation from neutron activation products. In addition to any fission byproducts within the test objects, the entire experimental array was placed on a carbon steel table, so coincident gamma-rays from 60 Co (produced by neutron irradiation of Fe) may be a contributing factor. While MC-NPX simulations showed the likelihood for crosstalk to be low (<2% for the composite-EJ309 pairing, negligible for composite-NaI(Tl)), a high background gamma-ray flux due to activation following generator operation could lead to an appreciable coincidence signal in the composite-EJ309 detector pairing due to crosstalk. Furthermore, the HEU object can be induced to fission by thermal neutrons, which can cause additional coincidence events. MCNPX simulations showed that thermal neutrons incident on the HEU object were about 70% as likely to produce coincident pulses as spontaneous fission events within the object when averaged over all directions, and much more likely to produce coincident pulses when incident near the EJ309 and composite detectors. Combined with natural background, the presence of neutronemitting calibration sources, such as AmBe, in the room during the experiment means that thermal neutron induced fission may also have been a factor.
With the goal of eliminating events that were not caused by fission, the coincidence rates were reexamined while only accepting neutron recoil pulses from the EJ309 detector. Fig. 9 shows the resulting coincidence time distributions for HEU and DU after interrogation with the neutron generator. Notably, the neutron-based coincidence time distribution for HEU is much broader than the corresponding distribution for DU and previous distributions where all event types were accepted. This is due to differences in the time of flight for difference neutron energies, and perhaps to some extent by the fact that coincident pulses may be produced by radiation from different generations in the fission chain reaction. The broadening of the HEU coincidence distribution is also accurately reflected in the MCNPX model, which has a full-width at half maximum (FWHM) of 15.7 ns, compared to 16.1 ns for the experimental data. A comparison of the simulated and experimentally measured coincidence peaks for HEU is shown in Fig. 10 . tron recoil criterion is applied. When coincidence events are required to contain at least one neutron interaction, the experimentally measured passive rates are much closer to those predicted by simulation. In the case of DU, the measured passive rate is within 2-σ of the simulated rate. After interrogation, the coincidence rate for DU increases by more than a factor of 2, even though delayed neutrons are not expected to cause an increase in coincidences due to fission, but this is most likely due to an increased number of pileup events in the neutron recoil region for EJ309, as Fig. 7(b) suggests. While the passive coincidence rate for HEU is still quite high relative to expectation, it is much closer than when all events are considered. Given the presence of other neutron sources in the room, it is also reasonable to assume that some of the discrepancy is accounted for by additional fissions caused by thermal neutrons. Most notably, the change in the HEU coincidence rate between the passive and active measurements is very significant, increasing by more than a factor of 20. This is consistent with the expectation that delayed neutrons will induce additional fission at a much greater rate in HEU than DU, providing the basis for discrimination. Furthermore, the time evolution of the rate of coincidence events from fission can provide valuable information on the 235 U content of the test material. Because the delayed neutron groups for each uranium isotope constitute a unique set of decay time constants, the overall delayed neutron time emission profile can be used to discriminate between isotopes and infer enrichment. Delayed neutron-induced fission events occur on the same timescale as their delayed neutron precursors, so coincidence-based measurements of the rate of delayed fission events should exhibit the same temporal shape predicted for delayed neutron emission. Fig. 11 shows the time distribution of coincidence events for HEU in the period after the neutron generator has been turned off.
FIG. 11: Time distribution of delayed coincidence events in HEU, measured using the composite-EJ309 detector pairing. Only neutron recoil pulses were accepted from the EJ309 detector. The fit is based on tabular nuclear data and parameterized with only a scaling factor (C) and constant background term (B).
The composite-EJ309 detector pairing was used again, but while accepting only neutron recoil events from the EJ309 detector. The experimental data are fitted with a parameterized model based on a six-group superposition of delayed neutrons, whose decay constants are obtained from tabular nuclear data; the procedure is described in depth in Ref. [23] . The experimental results show close agreement with the model (χ 2 = 200.2/198), which confirms that the coincidence events are caused by delayed neutron-induced fission and suggests that discrimination based on the delayed neutron time emission profile can also be performed using fast neutron measurements, provided that the material is fissionable by lower-energy delayed neutrons. The coincidence-based approach presented here could supplement the methods described in Ref. [23] , providing an additional point of distinction between isotopes.
In conclusion, we have demonstrated two measurement methods for differentiating the components of delayed neutron signals in bulk samples of SNM based on their origin. Through fission radiation coincidence counting and spectroscopic neutron energy measurements, we have shown a significant refinement in the ability to capture information on delayed neutron-induced fission as a means for performing isotopic identification. For fissionable materials with large differences in fission crosssection at typical delayed neutron energies, such as 235 U and 238 U, we show that these types of measurements are sufficient to successfully perform isotopic discrimination. Further refinement of the capture-gated neutron spectroscopy technique to detect small changes in the delayed neutron energy signature would provide even greater precision in differentiating materials. The measurement approaches presented here have the potential to complement existing delayed neutron analysis techniques, and when employed in concert with methods that focus on time-dependent signatures, they may lead to even greater accuracy in SNM characterization.
